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NA'l1 URE OF CASE
'l'liis is an action on an aerount for medical care and
trnat1tH'nt furnished by Weber County Memorial Hospital

to indigent residents of Davis County during the years
1968 and 1969.

S'l1ATE.MEN'l1 OFF ACTS
Weber County Memorial Hospital is an agency of
Weber county and the only extended care hospital in
northern Utah (T39-40, 65-66, 100-102). Davis County
does not have a tax supported hospital, although such a
facility was under serious consideration in 1968 (T5i,
121; Exh. 3 Pl).
The table below shows pertient factual data respecting the patients for whom appellant claims payment for
hospitalization subsequent to January 1, 1968.
INDIGENT SICK
NAME

CLAIM

Bishop, N. K.
Bodily, Julia

$

Bodily, 1F:red
Fitzpatrick, Beulah
Goldsberry, Mary
Murphy, Margaret
Robins, ELsie Emily
Seagrist, Judy
Shiramizu Youkiohi

.

Taylor, Eva
Willey Vosco

TOTAL CLAIMED

DATES OF HOSPITALIZATION
TO
FROM

5/ 6/69
2/27/'67
2/2'9/68
2/27 /67
5,0313.09
5/ 9/68
2,303.911
5/ 3/66
1,92.5.93
11,2:1 7.21Q 10/14166
6/ 81/66
5 607.44
9/ 4/69
169.50
4/14./'66
3,560.74
31/24/67
4,479.08 10/14/67
8/29/68
2/16/68
1,334.13
5/22/68
278.30
978.53

.

5/17/69
2/27/67
12/19/69
12:/119/69
5/ 3/69
12/18/69
12:/ 3/69
12/18/69
9/ 8/69
2/18/617
5/ 2/69
12/24/69
5/•20/68
3·/13/69

(T 9-10)
(T 10-22)
(T
(T
(T
<T
(T

23-31)
3·2-33)
33)
33·36)
36)
)1' 36-37)
(T 37
<T 37-38)
(T 38

$36,887.45

All of the
patients were Davis County residents throughout the period of hospitalization and each
2

of them was without sufficient income or property to
provide for medical care; and, if a determiniation were
made h)' the Division of Family Services, it would be
that eaeh patient was "medically indigent" and qualified as a reeipient of public welfare (:Stipulation T 2-4}':
Most of the listed patients were of adVianced age;
some died at discharge; some required acute care, i. e.
the injury or illness was such as to require special 24
hour attention; sorne were admitted from private hospitals; most were extended care patients; and, in every
C'ase, the type of care and necessity therefor was determined in the first instance by a physician subject to review by a hospitalization review board (T40-43, 67-89).
In each case, the care provided was "reasonable and
necessary" ( T43).
r1111e amounts claimed by plaintiff, as shown in the
table above, reflect only charges accruing on and aftei:
.January 1, 19G8, after crediting all payments received
from the patient or on his behalf from welfare or other
sources C.119-38).
Until February 10, 1968, Weber County had not
made a demand upon Davis County concerning the instant claims because the hospital accounting system
theretofore employed did not afford an adequate basis
for accurately costing care rendered each patient (T98).
However, from January 1, 1968, forward, an accounting system was in operation which did enable reliable
tracking of costs in relation to each patient (T98-102l.
'l1h(' new aeeounting system was installed by an in-

<lependent eertified public accountant who has since con-
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tinued to audit
operation (TlOl-103). According to
him, patient records maintained in Weber County Memorial Hospital on and after J anoory 1, 1968, have been
kept by competent personnel in consonance with accepted accounting principles and in a manner approved by
the American Hospital Association (T 102). Respecting
the particular accounts in litigation, audits reflected
that the amounts claimed against Davis County were
"true and correct cost figures" TlOl-102).
Shortly after the first billing had been mailed to
Davis County, the Weber County hospital administrator
was queried by the Davis County Clerk concerning details of the claim (T50, 91). There followed much
correspondence and discussion between the hospital administrator, Mr. George Goodell, the Davis County
Clerk, Mr. John M. Park, and the Boards of Commissioners of both counties (T54 et seq). Letters in May, July,
and November of 1968 from Mr. Goodell to the Davis
County Commissioners repeated demands for payment
on accounts then due (Plaintiff Exhs. 1, 2, and 4; T51,
56, 60). On August 5, 1968, Mr. Goodell met with the
Davis County Commissioners and, after explaining the
situation in detail, asked for relief. He was informed
that Davis County was unable to provide for the indigent
patients, but that the matter would he investigated further (Plaintiff Exh. 3; T57, 113. Thereafter Mr.
Moore, administrator of South Davis Hospital, a privately owned and operated institution in Davis County,
visited Mr. Goodell, representing that he had been asked
by the Davis County Commissioners to look into the possibility of transfer of the indigent patients (T-59). Noth4

ing came of the demands, discussion and inquiries until

about March 1969 when Mr. Galvin E. Smoot, Chairman
of the Board of Davis County Commissioners, met with
the Weber County Board of Commissioners (T60-62).
This last meeting, was also attended by Mr. Goodell
and Mr. Bennett P. P.eternon, Davis County Attorney. rl1 he patients were offered to be delivered to Davis
County on the following morning, unless Davis County
assumed the responsibility for their care. Mr. Smoot
demurred, with the suggestion that Davis County could
work something out (T64-65 ).

In addition to the intercourse between Weber and
Davis counties regarding these claims, individual appeals
for assistance were made directly to the Davis County
Board of Commissioners. On March 13, 1968, the husband of Elsie Robins, one of the indigent patients, appeared before the Davis County Board of Commissioners
and asked for county aid for medical expenses. The plea
was taken under advisement but Mr. Robins heard nothing further (Stipulation T3; Plaintiffs Exh. 3; T57,
118-120). Later, in about April, 1969, the daughter of
Fred ancl Julia Bodily who were also indigent Davis
County residents hospitalized in the Weber facility, appealed to the Davis County Commissioners ( T-25). She
1vas informed that no funds were available (T30). On
another occasion in J anuar)· 1968, Tanner Clinic of Davis
County applied for relief on behalf of indigent suppliants
for medieal aid but the Board of Commissioners referred
the Clinic spokesman to the welfare department (Plaintiff Exh. 3; T57).
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Davis County had budgeted $18,000 in 1968 for poor
and indigent of the county, but the appropriation was
not fully expended (T115-116). Among other things
the fund was used to provide legal aid (Defendant Exh.
1; T108-114). However, defendant's commissioners took
the position that indigent medical aid should not be provided for individuals eligible for welfare assistance and
therefore funds appropriated by the county for the poor
and indigent could not be expended to satisfy any part
of the claim in litigiation (Tl13, 124).
In March, 1970, a final demand was made on defendant by plaintiff, for the balance shown due in the
table above (Plaintiff Exh. 5; T67). Defendant refused
payment on the ground that it is not legally liable for
any part of the medical care of Davis County indigents
who are eligible and qualify for welfare assistance,
whether or not such assistance and other source payments are adequate to cover the cost of such care (T113124).
DISPOSITION BELOW
This case was heard in the District Court of Box
Elder County before the Honorable VeN oy Christofferson, District Judge, presiding without jury, on September 28, 1971. Subsequently, the Trial Court issued a
Memorandum Decision on February 3, 1972, in which
it was held that Davi_t:> County was not liable in the premises (R 166). Pursuant thereto, on March 13, 1972,
the Box Elder District Court entered judgment for defendant Davi8 County with pertinent "Findings of Fact"
6

and "Conclusions of Law" ( R170). This appeal is from
that judgment.
Rl£LIEF 80UGHrr ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks to have the judgment below reversed
and the case remanded to the trial court with instructiom; to enter judgment for plaintiff or such other relief as may be appropriate.
l'OIN1-1 I
1-1 HE FINDINGS OF FACrr BELOW ARE DEF'IGIENrr IN SCOPE AND DO NOT FAIRLY REFLECYr rrHE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.
]'indings of fact must be as broad as the legal ismes in dispute Rule 52, URCP ;S-imper v Brown, 74 Utah
178, 185-186, 278 P.
529; Gadd-is Investment Co. v.
Momson, 2 Utah 2d 43, 278 P. 2d 284, 285. It is necessary,
therefore, in evaluating the findings reached below to examine the law respecting liability of a county to make
adqeuate provision for its indigent s,ick.
rrhat counties have a substantial obligation in this
area is beyond dispute. As was noted in our trial
brief, from early times it has been considered the responsibility of civilized government to help the helpless .. at least with re·spect to the necessities of life. Sec.
41 Arn. J ur., Poor iand Poor Laws, §2, et, seq. In the
twentieth century in America, who would seriously contend that the poor must survive or perish according
to the
or nigga rdlineS's of alms-givers. The
only real question is which political entity is assigned

7

the role of protector. Answering that question, the
Utah legislature has provided:
"They [the county commissioners,] may provide
for the care, maintenance 1and relief of all indigent sick or otherwise dependent poor persons
who have lawfully settled in any part of the
county . . . ; and it is hereby made the duty of
each board of county conunissioners to provide
such care, maintenance and relief for the indigent
sick and poor, whether found within or without
the corporate limits of incorporated cities or
towns." Section 17-5-55, UCA, as amended.
The word "may" as used in the above statute has
been construed to express a mandate. See Op. Atty.
Gen. #68-052, Aug. 5, 1968, citing Board of County
Commissioners v. State (Wyo. 1962) 369 P. 2d 537, 542.
In Ogden City v. Weber County (1903) 76 Utah
129, 72 P. 433, it was held that 17-5-55, UCA, supra,
imposed a duty on Weber County to provide medical
aid to an indigent transient found in the City of Ogden
and the decision required the county to compensate the
city for expenses incurred in providing such care following refusal by county authorities to do so. Addressing the thrust of that decision, the attorney general
observed:
"Justice Bartch, speaking for the Utah Supreme
Court, said:
'The enactment was made in the interest
of humanity and mercy, and must receive
a liberal construction, so as to carry into
8

effect the humane and benevolent policy
adopted by the legislature.'

If, as the high tribunal held in the Ogden City
ca;:.;e, it is the duty of the county to provide for
care of the transient poor found within the county
in a helpless condition, then would a resident of
the county similarly situated be entitled to county
assistance? An affirmative reply is fairly compelled because the statute under consideration
in the Ogden City case was interpreted to mean
'all' indigent sick within a county." Op. Atty. Gen.
#68-052, supra.
four years after Ogden City, this honorable Court again addressed the question of county liaCache Valley General
hility respecting indigent sick.
HoiiJJital v. Cache County, 67 P. 2d 639 (1937). Cache
Valley dealt with a county indigent named Frank Palmer
who had been previously treated by plaintiff hospital
with defendant county's approval. Shortly after his
relea·se from the first course ·of treatment, in which a
toe had been amputated, Frank Palmer was rehospitalized and a leg was amputated. Apparently his condition was critical, at least initially, and the county clerk
had assented to the rehospitalization. Frank Palmer
was kept in the hospital five months following the
amputation of his leg and the county was not billed by the
hospital until the fourth month of his confinement.
Cache County paid one-third of the bill and plaintiff
hospital ;:.;ued for the remaining two-thirds. The trial
('Ourt there found against the hospital and on appeal,
thi::; Court remanded with instructions "to take evi-
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dence on the question of whether the plaintiff had,
after Palmer was returned, endeavored to get in touch
with the county before the amputation of a leg. If so
and it had not succeeded, how long after the amputation
it was necessary to keep Palmer before it would be
safe to remove him. If the hospitalization for such
period is more [than the sum already paid by the county]
plaintiff to obtain judgment for such additional sums and
costs of this appeal, if not the plaintiff is not to recover
any additional .and defendant shall be allowed its costs on
this appeal. If the lower Court finds that plaintiff
failed to use reasonatble efforts to contact the county
commissioners before the amputation after Palmer returned, the judgment shall stand [leaving the postoperative claim unpaid] and defendant shall have its
costs on appeal"
In reaching it's remand decision in Cache Valley,
the Supreme Court directed attention to two major
points which are also of immediate concern in this appeal. Firstly, there was the matter of necessitous circumstances. In discussing the kind of "emergency"
which would render acts of mercy compensable under
law, regardless of notice, the Court said:
"We are inclined to the view that in a jurisdiction
like ours, where there is a relaxation of the strict
rule of nonliability for services rendered to a
poor person ·without special authorization or consent of an official designated by state to authorize
the performance (see note, 93 ALR 900), the
rule that the necessity for attention must he ur<rent should be enforced; otherwise the door might
b
10

lie opened for unscrupulous people to file claims
against the county for alleged indigents they
purported to care for. But we do not want to
be 1f;nderstood as saying that where, as in the
instant case, the patient reasonably appeared in
urtJCmt need of attention and it was impossible
tu know what was his condition, that attention
qiven in such case without authorization may not
be the basis of a good claim." Cache Valley 67 P.
2d 643; (Italics supplied)
Secondly, relative to the matter of "notice", it was observed that the Cache County Commissioners did indeed
know of Frank Palmers' hospitalization, though the
county clerk was without authority to obligate the county
therefor. But, a distinction wa:s drawn between such
informal notice or knowledge and a demand for payment. Treating the issue as one of estoppel, the Court
concluded, making reference to the laches of the hospital
in demanding payment- "When one who has the duty
to move, has not done so, he cannot excuse his failure
on the theory that the other knew of his situation and
therefore it was the other's duty to move" Cache Valley
67 P. 2d 644. That, of 0ourse, is not the instant case
respecting the period of time for which claim was made.
What circumstance::-; constitute an "emergency" under the rules applied in Cache Valley is important. To
say that the situation must be "most urgent" does not
particularly darify the requirement. Some clarity, however, i::-; attained by adverting to the language employed
i11r'ac71c Valley in refrrring to the right of recoupment
aec·rning absent notice but before the patient ha::-;
11

reached a level of health allowing him to be "safely removed". Cache Valley 67 P. 2d G44, supra. It is suggested that any condition below that level is an ''emergency".
Among the facts found below is a finding that
"There appears to have been no emergency in the admission of any of the patients." (Finding No. 4, R170).
The trial court also found that the patients involved
were admitted at various times during 1966, 67, 68 and
69 (Finding No. 6; R 170). And, it was further found
that Davis County was not contacted at the time of admission of any of these patients (Finding No. 7; R 171).
Apart from minor inaccuracies, (compare findings atS
to dates of admission with table in statement of facts
above) these findings are severally questionable and are
collectively pregnant with error.
Conceding that the record does not disclose many
details of the condition of these patients at admission,
it is not entirely silent. There is some evidence of emergency within the meaning of that term as applied jn the
Cache Valley case. Testimony shows that at least
some of the patients were categorized as "acute care"
cases (T68, 71, 77). All were hospitalized on the order
of a physician whose judgment was reviewed by a hospital board (T41). And, the uncontradicted evidence of
record shows that
in every case was
"reasonable and necessary" ( T43). rraking into consideration the complete absence of negative evidence on
this issue, the finding that there was "No emergency"
upon any of these admissions is unwarranted. Beyond
that, those findings which concern admission dates long
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;wtedating Ute period covered hy plaintiffs claim and
the furtlte1· finding:; of "no notice" at such times suggest
<1Jlpl1rntion of a rnle 111ore stringent than contemplated in
statnk or the reported cases. No where in the findings
is
there rderenee to the teaehing of Cache Valley
that a
indigent's benefactor is entitled to compensation, regnrdle:ss of notice until he may be "safely
removed", i. e. discharged from the hospital. Accordingl:-·, tlw findings referenced not only err in part
in what they 8ay but are equally deficient in failing to reach tlte issue presented by continuing neceseircurn8tanees long past the initial emergency, if
such there was.
T\\ o further finding8 of fact raise implications of
erro1-. It was found that "notice" was first given by
vVeher County to Davis County in February, 1968 but
that ''formal demand" was made in .!\[arch 1970 (Finding No. 8; H171). 'rhe plain fact is that an itemized statement was sent to Davi8 County in February, 1968 and
for seYPrnl succeeding month8 in which payment for the
claim8 here in i8:me was demanded (Plaintiff Exh. 1;
'L1;)1-3J). The 1970 demand w.as 8imply a prelude to suit
required by stante ancl should have no significance in relation to the _Cacl1e Valley reqnirernent of timely
demand (17-15-10 UCA,
as amended). Finally, it
was found that Davis Count:, did not "affirm, authorize
or rntif;.'" in the premises (Finding No. 9; R171). But,
there is no firnling to reach the issue raised by plaintiff's <lemand ,and ckfendnnts responsive demurrer to
111<'

\Vellt-r Count:- proposal to turn ont or discharge the

llaYi:-; ( 'ouuty indigent patients ('L'G4-(j;J). The language

13

·Of .. Cache Valley indicates that unlike that case
this may be one to apply the doctrine of estoppel and'
findings of fact appropriate to that issue were required.

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING
AS A
OF LAW THAT THE CARE RENDERED TO DA VIS COUN'l1Y INDIGEN'J1S BY WEBER
COUNTY WAS VOLUNTARY.
It was concluded by the trial court that "the care
rendered by Weber County was given on a voluntary
basis" (R171).
Presumably the foregoing conclusion of law is predicated on the preliminary findings of fact relating to
"no emergency" and failure to make timely demand discussed in Point I, above. vVhether in the first instance,
appellant was a pure volunteer in the sense that the care
extended was an act of charity stemming solely from
humane impulse has no more relevance than such a supposition is deserving of credit. High purpose of a good
samaritan should not lessen the legal obligation of one
otherwise liable for benefits bestowed ex necessitate.
Nor does it.
Moving forward to post admission time frames, the
proposition that appellant could sununarily discharge
the Davis County indigents and put them on the street
without dire legal conseqnences, medical judgment to the
contran· notwithstanding, is not in accord with the
weight of aut11ority. :1G ALR :-M 841, 842; 40 Am .Jnr. 2d
Hm;pitals and Asylums §16. .Mere continuation of hos14

pitafo-::ation in the face of rejection of liability by Davis
doc.s not convert a dutiful act to one of pure
('harity or make Weber County a "volunteer".
The situation of an indigent sick person in relation
to
eounty of residence is analogous to that of child
to parent, insofar as medical ne<.:essaries are concerned.
Cf, Section 17-14-1, UCA, 19;'>3, as amended; and, 39 Am .
.Tur. Parent and Child §47,54; 59 Am. Jur. 2d Parent ann
Child, 59, 87. Lack of prior notice in such cases is not
a bar to recovery by one who furnishes necessaries if
the parent has refused and neglected to do so or if the
need is patently clear.
See Rees 'Ii. Archibald 6
Utah 2d, 2ti-i, 311 P 2d 788 (1957). Here, appellant furnished medieal necessaries to defendant's indigent sick
in the role of an agent ex necessitate after notice
and demand on appellee in February of 1968 and, acrordingly, appellant is entitled to reimbursement for the
expense incurred. Cf. Stimpson u. Himter 25
NE
155 (Mass, 1919, 7 ALR 1067, 1070).
Implicit in the pertinent legislation is a proscription;
viz., a county may not shunt its burden of poor relief to
a neighboring county by the simple expedient of not providing an accessible public medical facility of its own.
Persons in immediate need of the services of a hospital,
as the evidence presented at trial shows \Vas the instant
case, should not be expected to first navigate county administrative and executive chamwls, particularly if the
question is whether, rather than where. Even assuming
a prnspectiw patil'nt lives so long, ad hoc decisions by
lrnanls of eoun ty <:01mnissioners are dubious substitutes
15

for informed medical judgments.
declared it to be:

When the legislature

" ... the duty of each board of county commissioners to provide such care ... for the indigent
sick ... " Section 17-5-55, UCA, supra.
it could hardly have intended that the board would never
be bound to provide care without "prior" consultation
and direction in each individual case.
Ogden __ City, supra,

has been cited in support of
the contention that county responsibility for care of its
indigent sick is conditioned upon a right of first refusal,
regardless of circumstances. It does not establish any
such rule. rrhough there was, in fact, a refusal by the
defendant county in Ogden City to provide for the
care of an ailing transient, the case holds no more than
that the county was not at liberty to reject its responsibility out of hand. Neither in that case nor in any other
known to appellant has it been held that application or
notice "prior" to rendering aid is an absolute prerequisite to liability under Section 17-5-55, UCA.
Applying a strict rule of "prior" notice to avoid the
label ''volunteer", would contravene that rule of interpretation which requires a liberal construction of statutory provisions with a view toward insuring effectuation
of legislative purpose. Section 68-3-2, UCA, 1953, as
amended. The humanitarian object of the statute in
issue, i e, Section 17-5-.J\ is clear, necessary medical
assistance shall not l)(_: denied the poor. But, the indigent sick migltt well he the indigent dead if a rigid notice
and refusal condition is interposed. At best, ::melt a rule

16

draw.-; justification from thl' premise that a county is
llrejndieed if denied the opportunity to select a care and
I reatuwnt facility or to make an indigency evaluation.
Hut, no possibility of prejudice exists in the circum:-;lan('es under which these C'lai1m; arose since the indigents were> memben; of an ineligible class under county
interpretation of the law and the condition of indigency
was stipulated.

Good sense and a reasonable concession to the hurnanitarian ohject of Section 17-5-55 suggests that liabilit)T of the county of residence attaches at the instant
that necessary medical aid is rendered an indigent resident, subject only to equitable considerations of estoppel
or laches operating to prejudice the rights, privilege or
position of the resident C'Ounty. If, in the instant case,
appellant had failed to notify appellee of the illness of
these indigents within a reasonable time, perhaps such
failure would be a valid defense. But the facts are otherwise. Here, there is evidence of grave illness, prompt
attention and notice in the course of hospitalization.
Apprllants claim is limited to the period covered by
timel)' demand. that is from January, 1968 forward, and,
Weber County has not sought recovery for those earlier
c·osts as to whieh tirnel.v
and rtemand were not
made. F'urther, there is evidence of refmsal by appellee
to render aid to its medical indigents at the time of need,
even as in Ogden City.
For the latter portion of the
dai111s i.

l»

those aeeruing subsequent to F'ebruary 10,

it would see111 apJJPllee is liahle under the rule of

"prior" noti('l' that it has urged should be the law.

As

to liability for the initial month of treatrnent in eaeh ease,
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i. e. January 1968, appellant contends it is entitled to recover under the literal terms of the statute, absent any
showing by defendant that plaintiffs conduct operated
to its prejudice.
POINT III
THE rrRIAL COUR'L' ERRED IN CONCLUDING
THAT COMPLIANCE BY DA VIS COUNTY "'.,.rrH
§17-5-55. 5 UCA, 1953, as amended, FULFILLED ITS
OBLIGATION TO DA VIS COUNTY INDIGENrrs.
According to the trial court, the obligation of a county to provide care to medical indigents who are qualified
for welfare assistance ceases upon appropriation of a
sum equivalent to a 1/2 mill levy to the state hospital and
medical care account (R 171).
At the time of Cache Valley, state law specifically limited county levies for the relief of sick and indigent. Then, in counties with property valuation of
over $12,000,000 - the maximum levy was 112 mill (RS
1933, § 80-9-5 ). In the Code of 1953, the Cache Valley
law was replaced, permitting, inter alia, a 1 mill levy
for sick and indigent in counties with a valuahon in excess of $100,000,000 - (59-9-6, UCA, 1953). Finally, in
it's wisdom, the legislature in 1961 repealed the formula
levies impo·sed on counties and substituted a single
aggregate mill levy limitation, leaving sick and indigent
allocations to the di:::;cretion of focal authorities. At the
time these claims arose, Davis County was vested with
full discretio11, as it is now, to make adequate pr.ovision
in it's budget for the needs of rnedical indigents ( 59-9-6-2
UCA, 1953, as amended).
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In the Memorandum Decision below, Cache Valley
is quoted at length in connection with the then prevailing mill levy limitation applicable to sick and indigent. Among excerpts quoted, is the observation that;
"A requirement imposed upon an official or board to expend money is not a duty past the amount available"
(Memo, Dec.; R 107). However, as indicated, express
limitations on sick and indigent expenditures are no
more and whatever force the Cache Valley opinion
may have had before 1961, in that respect it is no longer
apt.
To properly assess the interaction of the public welfare statutory provisions with the mandate of§ 17-5-55
it i8 necessary to look at both the letter of the law and the
law in action. § 17-5-55.5 UCA, which is said below to
relieve Davis County of its obligation in this case, reads
as follows:
"Each and every county commissioner shall appropriate from the general funds of the county an
amount of money not to exceed the equivalent of a
1h mill levy which, in its judgment, based upon historical experience and projected need as determined
in consultation with the state department of public
welfare, shall be equal to one-third (1/3) of the
anticipated annual costs of medical treatment and
hospitalization for the medically indigent, but in no
event shall such annual appropriation be less than
one hundred dollar::; ($100). Moneys so appropriated shall he deposited with the state treasurer who
::;hall credit the
to a hospital and medical care
account.

Eligibility requirements for hospital and medical
care shall be determined hy the state department of
public welfare and shall be uniform for all counties.
Payment for such care shall be made by the department or division of state government administering
the Public Assistance Act of 1961 upon notification
to the county in which the indigent resides for whom
payment is being made and the county commissioners agree. Disbursement from the hospital and
medical care account shall be made only for costs
accrued in excess of care limits otherwise established for the care of such patients by the state department or division administering the Public Assistance Act of 1961." Section 17-5-55.5, UCA, supra.
Elsewhere it is provided that the State Division of ],amily Services shall set standards and determine questions
of eligibility. Cf. §55-15-21; §55-15-10; and, §55-15-23,
UCA, 1953, as amended. Regarding the scope of §17-555.5, the Public Assistance Act Reads:
1

" ... It is declared to be the intent of the legislature that the most adequate medical care and services possible shall be provided for those eligible;
within the limitations of the approvriations made
for the bienniwn for the purpose of this subsection
together with federal matching funds as may be
available." 55-15-23 (6), UCA, 1953, as amended;

(italics supplied).
Reason suggests the question: If the biennium appropriation is ;-;o thinly spread among the ''medically indigent" or the indigent sick that it falls short of need,
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who must payq And the legislature has plainly answered:
'' ... it is hereby made the duty of each board of
county conunissioners to provide such care ... " 175-55,UCA, supra.
As was urged below, the contention that a recipient
of welfare i·s a man without a county when in need of
medical aid, would not only mistake legislative intent
but do injustice both to the individual and to those who
ministered to his need. It is not so easy to turn away a
desperately ill patient at the hospital door as it might
be to reject a plea for money at a commi'ssioners meeting. Nor should it be. Yet, even apart from compassionate considerations, the door to the emergency room
at the hospital must open, in appropriate cases, regardless of the ability ·of the individual to pay. See 35 ALR
3d 841, 847; 40 Am Jur. 2d, Hospitals and Asylums §16.
And, a's between a hospital which has no connection of
any kind with the patient and the county where the
patient lived, labored, and paid taxes, which has the
greater obligation to bear the cost of his illness 1
In the instant case, the patients came from Davis
County. The institution in which they found refuge
was 0onstructed and i·s maintained at great expense to
the taxpayers of Weber County. In 1968, the citizens
in caring for their own indigent sick
of Weber
at the county hospital, incurred costs of $229,974.34; in
1969, the figure was $295,031.46; and, in 1970, $310,311.49.
Appellee, has not undertaken to invest in a county
rnediral facility and presumably, in accord with its oon-
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tention in this case, has a no cost record, at least for
its welfare patient's, for the same years. As to the
annual appropriations under Section 17-5-55.5, UCA,
supra, appellant has met assessments over and above
direct oounty aid which, as noted, totalled $835,318.29
for the years 1968-70. Taking cognizance of the respective outlays and the provision each party has made
to meet it s ,obligation to the poor, denial of the claim
of plaintiff would be to reward neglect of county obligations and penalize taxpayers whose only wrong was to
act as good samaritans to strangers in need.
1

The record in thi,s case clearly shows that even
after all benefits obtainable from the state and other
sources under the Public Assistance Act had been fully
realized, Weber County was still out of pocket many
thousands which, in both equity and law, ought to be
paid out of Davis County tax revenues. Either the
State, through its' Department of Social Services under
appellees theory and that of the oourt below should be
held to a full mea·sure of cost or, as appellant has consistently urged, § 17-5-55 should be oonstrued to require
appellee Davis County to meet the legitimate needs of
its indigent residents. A judgment against Weber County on the facts here present is a manif e:::;t injustice and
an impo'Sition on the taxpayers of the appellant county.
CONCLUrSION
The judgment below misplace·s the burden of public
relief. Uuder the law of Utah, care of the indigent
sick is a county obligation exeepl to the extent that the
state will provide necessary finan<'ial assistance. Where
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state aid ends, county responsibility begins and both
law an<l equity require that each county assume the
lmrden in relation to those residing within their respective boundaries.
According to the record of proceedings in this case,
indigent sick of Davis County received reasonable and
necessary medical care in appellants hospital. So much
of that care for which reimbursement is sought was
furnished after demand had been made on appellee and
appellee through its oounty commissioners neglected
and refused either to pay or make alternative provision
for the care of its' indigent sick. The record also shows
that the claim is further limited and reduced by crediting
all state aid and other benefits obtainable on the patients'
behalf.
In the foregoing circumstances and on the basis
record, the judgment given for defendantof the
avpellee, below should be reversed and the case remanded
with instruction to enter judgment for plaintiff-appellant.
Respectfully ::mbmitted,
Robert L. Newey, Esq.
Weber County Attorney
Philip .J. Williamson, Esq.
Deputy Weber County Attorney
Attorneys for the Plaintiff-Appellant
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